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Abstract
What is the eect of ambiguity aversion on trade? Although in a Bew-
ley's model ambiguity aversion always lead to less trade, in other models
this is not always true. However, we show that if the endowments are
unambiguous then more ambiguity aversion implies less trade, for a very
general class of preferences. The reduction in trade caused by ambiguity
aversion can be as severe as to lead to no-trade. In an economy with MEU
decision makers, we show that if the aggregate endowment is unanimously
unambiguous then every Pareto optima allocation is also unambiguous.
We also characterize the situation in which every unanimously unambigu-
ous allocation is Pareto optimal. Finally, we show how our results can be
used to explain the home-bias eect. As a useful result for our methods,
we also obtain an additivity theorem for CEU and MEU decision makers
that does not require comonotonicity.
JEL Code: D51, D6, D8.
Keywords: no-trade results, ambiguity aversion, Pareto optimality.
1 Introduction
What is the relationship between \uncertainty aversion" and trade? This ques-
tion was considered by Frank Knight and John M. Keynes,1 and was the main
topic of seminal papers by Truman Bewley. Bewley had a clear intuition about
the implications of uncertainty aversion to the propensity of trade: uncertainty
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1See Keynes (1937), specially p. 216, and Knight (1921, p. 269).
1aversion reduces trade. This can be explicitly noted in the initial phrases of Be-
wley (1989)'s sections 3 and 5, respectively: \Knightian decision theory yields
an easy explanation of the infrequency of betting on events of unknown proba-
bility" (p.8) and \An easy generalization of the results of Section 3 provides a
simplistic explanation of the absence of markets for the insurance of uncertain
events" (p. 12).
However, the Knightian decision theory introduced by Bewley (1986) (see
also Bewley (2002)) is not the only model of uncertainty or ambiguity aversion in
economics. It seems natural to expect that Bewley's intuition would also hold
for other models of ambiguity aversion, making all these models compatible
in this aspect. Despite the impressive amount of knowledge accumulated about
these models, so far the literature lacks proper parallel results to those of Bewley
(1989). The rst main result of this paper establishes sucient conditions for
Bewley's intuition that \more uncertainty aversion implies less trade" in the
case of general preferences.
This result has some caveats, however. To see this, consider an Ellsberg
urn (Ellsberg (1961)) with three balls (one red, and two blue or green) and two
individuals. Individual one is given the endowment e1 = (e1(R);e1(B);e1(G)) =
(0;1;0), that is, she will receive one unit of the good (or $1) if the ball is blue
(B), and nothing otherwise. Individual two has the endowment e2 = (1;0;1).2 If




say), then there is no opportunity for a Pareto improving trade. However, if
there is more uncertainty aversion (like in the standard Ellsberg paradox), then
the trade z = (1; 1;0) leading to allocations x1 = (1;0;0) and x2 = (0;1;1)
is Pareto improving. In this example, more uncertainty aversion leads to more
trade! How can this be possible, if we said above that \more uncertainty aversion
implies less trade"? The answer lies in the assumption about the endowments:
Bewley's intuition holds true (and hence our result), under the assumption
that the endowments are unambiguous. If endowments are ambiguous, then
ambiguity aversion can lead to the opposite result, that is, more trade, as in
this example.
We are agnostic whether Bewley's intuition is or not the right description of
the eect of uncertainty aversion on trade. However, our rst contribution is to
identify a crucial assumption for Bewley's intuition to hold in general models
of ambiguity aversion|that the endowments are unambiguous|and to show it
fails otherwise.3 We are unaware of papers that discuss this issue.
From this \comparative statics" result, a natural question is: under what
conditions will ambiguity aversion reduce trading opportunities so much that
they will disappear? The absence of trading opportunities is the dening prop-
erty of Pareto optimal allocations. Therefore, a rephrase of this question would
be: is it possible to give a characterization of Pareto optimal allocations when
2We are grateful to Mark Machina for suggesting us this simple example.
3 It may be interesting to note that, apparently, Bewley obtained his results without any
assumption similar to unambiguity of endowments. However, Bewley made extensive use of
his \inertia assumption" and in his model this assumption seemed to play a parallel role to
that of unambiguous endowments.
2individuals' preferences have ambiguity aversion? It is not dicult to see how
important these questions are for the understanding of the implications of un-
certainty to trade.
To investigate these questions, we particularize our study to Schmeidler
(1986)'s CEU and Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)'s MEU models, the two most
traditional ambiguity aversion models. We begin by following Nehring (1999)
and dene the set of unambiguous events and acts in these two settings. Then,
we establish an additivity theorem (Theorem 2.1) that is of interest by itself,
because it requires neither comonotonicity (as used since Schmeidler (1986))
nor slice-comonotonicity (introduced by Ghirardato (1997)). This additivity
theorem requires instead that one of the acts is unambiguous.
From this, we investigate the eects of uncertainty aversion in two situa-
tions: betting and insurance. Betting corresponds to the situation where the
event in consideration has no relevant implications for the endowment of the
decision maker. Insurance, on the other hand, is related to situations where the
individual's endowment may be aected by the realization of the event. It turns
out that the implications for both cases are dierent.
In the betting case, we generalize a result by Dow and Werlang (1992). For
the insurance case, we obtain a version of the main results of Billot, Chateau-
neuf, Gilboa, and Tallon (2000) and Rigotti, Shannon, and Strzalecki (2008) for
situations where the aggregate endowment is not constant. Our result shows the
equivalence of a common conditional prior and that Pareto optimal allocations
are unambiguous. We also show that if the individuals are risk neutral, then the
fact that Pareto optimal allocations are unambiguous is equivalent to a common
prior (not conditional).
The remaining sections are organized as follows. The related literature is
discussed below in section 1.1. Section 2 introduces notation and denitions
and present the additivity theorem. Section 3 formalizes and proves that \more
ambiguity aversion implies less trade". Section 4 presents our result for the
betting situation. Our results regarding the characterization of Pareto optimal
allocations and our no-trade theorems are presented in section 5. Section 6 dis-
cusses some potential applications, specially to the home-bias eect. Section 7
is a conclusion. All proofs not included in the text are collected in the appendix.
1.1 Related Literature
Many papers have established characterizations of full insurance Pareto opti-
mal allocations, in which case there is no further opportunity for trade. See
for instance Dow and Werlang (1992), Epstein and Wang (1994), Tallon (1998),
Billot, Chateauneuf, Gilboa, and Tallon (2000), Chateauneuf, Dana, and Tal-
lon (2000), Mukerji and Tallon (2001), Dana (2002), Abouda and Chateauneuf
(2002), Dana (2004), Rigotti and Shannon (2005), Asano (2006), Rigotti and
Shannon (2007), Rigotti, Shannon, and Strzalecki (2008) and Strzalecki and
3Werner (2011).4;5 We discuss in more detail three of these papers which seem
closer related to our results.
Mukerji and Tallon (2001) explored the explanation of the incompleteness of
markets through ambiguity aversion. They assume CEU DMs, and that there
are two dimensions characterizing the world: an economic state and an idiosyn-
cratic state. Their setting satises slice-comonotonicity, a property introduced
by Ghirardato (1997) that is a generalization of comonotonicity. Ghirardato
(1997) proved that slice-comonotonicity is sucient to an additivity theorem
that is fundamental for Mukerji and Tallon (2001) result. They show that some
assets are not traded, leading to incomplete markets.
Rigotti and Shannon (2007) considered the correspondence from endowments
to equilibria allocations and prices under variational preferences (as introduced
by Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini (2006)). They say that an economy
with endowment e is determinate if the number of equilibria is nite and this
correspondence is continuous. Then, they show that the set of endowments
that lead to determinate economies is of full measure. This result highlights the
importance about the assumptions about the endowments. If endowments are
led completely undisciplined, their result implies that ambiguity aversion may
have no discernible implication. However, when we focus our attention on some
special class of endowments, then ambiguity aversion may lead to interesting
phenomena, that are worth investigating.
Maybe the paper most closely related to ours is Strzalecki and Werner (2011),
although our models are not completely comparable. Instead of focusing on
unambiguous allocations, they consider conditional beliefs with respect to the
partition induced by the aggregate endowment. They show that if there exists at
least a common consistent conditional belief, then every interior Pareto optimal
allocation is (essentially) measurable with respect to that partition (see details
in their paper).
2 Preliminaries
This section establishes the notation, denitions and a preliminary result (an
additive theorem for CEU and MEU preferences) that will be useful later on.
4Stecher, Lunawat, Pronin, and Dickhaut (2011) discuss trade and ambiguity in a context
of auctions. Condie and Ganguli (2010) and Ozsoylev and Werner (2009) study rational
expectations equilibrium with ambiguous information.
5 In some sense, this literature tries to accomplish something that was already advocated
for by Machina (1989), who observed that \non-expected utility models of individual decision
making can be used to conduct analyses of standard economic decisions under uncertainty,
such as insurance, gambling, investment, or search." He urged for this kind of research on the
following grounds: \unless and until economists are able to use these new models as engines
of inquiry into basic economic questions, they|and the laboratory evidence that has inspired
them|will remain on a shelf" (p. 1623).
42.1 Mathematical Notation
Let 
 be the set of states of the world and let 2
 be the set of subsets of 
.

 is not assumed to be nite, unless explicitly stated otherwise. For A  
,
we denote 
nA by Ac. Let  be a sigma-algebra over 
. Let  be the set of
nitely additive probability measures  :  ! [0;1] over 
.
The set of simple (nite-valued) acts f : 
 ! R measurable with respect to
 will be denoted by B0 (). Following the standard practice, we treat x 2 R
as an element of B0 () simply by associating it to an act x 2 B0 () that is
constant and has value x for each ! 2 
.
We denote by B () the closure of B0 () in the sup-norm and by B1 ()
the set of bounded -measurable real-valued functions on 
, endowed with the
sup-norm k  k topology. ba() denotes the space of bounded nitely addi-
tive measures on (
;), which is (isometrically isometric to) the norm dual of
B1 (). We will assume that ba() is endowed with the weak topology and
will denote by  (or just ) the subset of nitely additive probabilities. We
will write B+(), B
+
0 () and B+
1() to refer to the subsets of B(), B0()
and B1(), respectively, that include only non-negative functions.
If A 2 , we denote by 1A 2 B0 () the indicator function of A, that is,
1A (!) = 1 if ! 2 A, and 0 otherwise. To simplify notation, we will denote the
event f! 2 
 : h(!) > tg by fh > tg and avoid the braces whenever this causes
no confusion.
2.2 Notation and Assumptions for Economies
Let N = f1;2;:::;ng be the set of decision makers or consumers. Each consumer
i 2 N has an endowment ei, which is a function ei : 
 ! R+.6 An economy E
is a prole (<i;ei)i2N of preferences and endowments for each i 2 N. For later
use, let us denote by i the set of unambiguous events for consumer i.







i2N ei. A feasible trade is a vector z = (zi)i2N such
that
P
i2N zi 6 0. Unless otherwise stated, all allocations and trades in this
paper will be assumed feasible and all allocations will be assumed non-negative.
An allocation f = (fi)i2N is Pareto optimal if there is no feasible allocation
g = (gi)i2N such that gi <i fi for all i and gj j fj for some j.The set of Pareto
improving traded assets is the set T (E) formed by the proles (zi)i2N 6= 0
which are Pareto improving (that is, ei +zi <i ei for all i 2 N and 9j 2 N such
that ej + zj j ej). In other words, T (E) is the set of trade proles z which
makes e + z a Pareto improvement upon e. It is also useful to dene the set
of Pareto optimal trades O(E)  T (E), formed by those trade proles z which
make e + z a Pareto optimal allocation. Similarly, let Ou (E)  T (E), denote
the set of trade proles z which make e+z a Pareto optimal allocation and, for
each i 2 N, ei + zi is unambiguous (see denition below).
6Our results can be generalized for l > 1 goods. We work with l = 1 good for simplicity.
52.3 Unambiguous Events and Acts
Epstein and Zhang (2001), Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) and Zhang (2002)
propose dierent denitions of unambiguous events for general preferences.7 All
of our results that are stated for general preferences (e.g. those in section 3)
hold for any of these denitions. However, it will be useful to x a simple
denition in the MEU and the CEU case. (See the appendix for a denition
of these preferences.) Dealing with CEU preferences, Nehring (1999) considers
four alternative denitions of unambiguous events. In the CEU case, we will
adopt the last of his denitions, since it has \nice" properties, as we explain
below. We dene unambiguous events as follows:
Denition 2.1 An event A 2  is unambiguous if:
 In the MEU-paradigm:  (A) = 0 (A) for any ;0 2 P.
 In the CEU-paradigm:  (B) =  (B \ A)+  (B \ Ac), 8B 2 .
The set of unambiguous events A 2  is denoted by u.8
See Nehring (1999) for a justication of the set of unambiguous events in the
CEU paradigm. In the MEU paradigm, the denition seems the most natural
one. The denition of unambiguous acts follows naturally:
Denition 2.2 An act f 2 B1 () is unambiguous if f is u-measurable in
the following sense: f! 2 
 : f (!) > tg 2 u holds for almost every t, with
respect to the Lebesgue measure  of R.9
In appendix A.2, we establish some facts about unambiguous events that
may be of technical interest.
2.4 An Additivity Theorem for CEU and MEU Prefer-
ences
The objective of this section is to establish an additivity theorem for CEU
and MEU preferences, as introduced by Schmeidler (1986) and Gilboa and
Schmeidler (1989), respectively. In the CEU pardagim, the additive property
played a central role from the beginning. Indeed, Schmeidler (1986) proved
the equivalence between the Choquet integral representation and the additivity
property with respect to a special set of acts: the set of comonotonic acts.10
Since then, additivity of the Choquet integral has been essentially restricted to
7See Amarante and Filiz (2007) and, more recently, Klibano, Marinacci, and Mukerji
(2011) for a discussion and comparison of these denitions.
8When we consider a set of DMs N = f1;:::;ng, the unambiguous set of events for indi-
vidual i 2 N is denoted i.
9When dealing with economies, we say that an allocation x = (x1;:::;xn) is unambiguous
if xi is unambiguous for each i = 1;:::;n.
10 Two acts g;h 2 B () are comonotonic if (g (!)   g (!0)) (h(!)   h(!0)) > 0, 8!; !0 2

.
6the case of comonotonic acts. In fact, Ghirardato, Klibano, and Marinacci
(1998) established also a connection between comonotonicity and the additiv-
ity of a functional representing MEU preferences.11 Another result related to
additivity is presented by Ghirardato (1997), who dened the property of slice-
comonotonicity, which is satised in the following simple setting: 
 = XY and
the functions f;g 2 B0 () can be described by f (x;y) = x and g (x;y) = y. If
 satises a property that he calls Fubini property, and x and y are the
marginals of  with respect to X and Y; respectively, then
R
(f + g)d = R
fdx+
R
gdy. This result was used by Mukerji and Tallon (2001) to prove a
result on the incompleteness of nancial markets with ambiguity aversion. This
suggests that additivity is not only a mathematical curiosity but an important
property for studying economic aspects of ambiguity.
Theorem 2.1 (Additivity Theorem) Consider CEU or MEU maximizers.
Let f 2 B1 () be unambiguous.12 Then, for all g 2 B1 (),
I (f + g) = I (f) + I (g):
The proof of Theorem 2.1, given in the appendix, depends crucially on the
denition of unambiguous events and acts (denitions 2.1 and 2.2). That is,
other denitions of unambiguous events will not yield the above result. For the
case of CEU decision makers with a convex capacity, there is a short proof, as
follows.
Proof of Theorem 2.1 for the case of convex . From Schmeidler (1986,
Proposition 3, p. 260) we know that I (f + g) > I (f)+ I (g) and I (g) =
min2core(;) I (g). Let  2 core(;) be such that I (g) = I (g). We intend
to show that I (f) = I (f). Recall from (3) that I (f) =
R 0
 1 [ (h > t)   1]dt
+
R 1
0  (h > t)dt. Since f is unambiguous, ff > tg 2 u, for almost all t 2 R.
Taking A = ff > tg and B = 
 in item (ii) of Denition 2.1, we obtain
 (h > t) +  (h < t) = 1 for almost all t. Since  2 core(;), this implies
 (h > t) =  (h > t), for all t 2 R and, consequently, I (f) = I (f). Thus,
I (f)+ I (g) = I (f)+ I (g) > minp2core(;) Ip (f + g) = I (f + g). This
completes the proof.
Unfortunately, the converse of the Theorem 2.1 does not hold in general for
the MEU case, as the following example shows.
Example 2.2 Suppose that 
 = fa, b; c; dg and P = cof1; 2g dened by
1 = ( (fag),  (fbg),  (fcg),  (fdg)) = (1
2, 0, 0, 1
2) and 2 = (0, 1
2, 1
2, 0).




2):  2 [0;1]g and u =ffa, bg, fc;
dg, fa, cg, fb; dgg. Consider the act f dened by (f (a), f (b), f (c), f (d)) =
(4, 3, 2, 1). This is obviously not u-measurable, but 8 2 P,
















11They characterize additivity of pair of functions through comonotonicity and ane trans-
formations.
12See section 2.3 for a denition of unambiguous acts in the CEU and MEU frameworks.
7Thus, I (f) = IP (f) 8 2 P. Following the proof of Theorem 2.1 in the
appendix, it is not dicult to see that this is sucient for additivity.
It is, however, remarkable that for the CEU-paradigm in the case of ambi-
guity aversion, i.e., for  convex, the converse of Theorem 2.1 holds true. Such
a result, Theorem 2.3 below, reinforces the meaningfulness of what we called
unambiguous acts.13
Theorem 2.3 Let f 2 B+
1 (). For CEU ambiguity averse decision makers,
i.e., when  is convex, the following assertions are equivalent:
(i) I (f + g) = I (f)+ I (g), for all g 2 B+
1 ();14
(ii) I (f) + I ( f) = 0;
(iii) f is unambiguous.
3 More Ambiguity Aversion Implies Less Trade
The purpose of this section is to formalize and prove the following claim: \more
ambiguity aversion implies less trade". This result is valid for any rational
(complete and transitive) preference such that the endowment of each consumer
is unambiguous for that consumer. Before describing the results, we need to
clarify what we mean by \more ambiguity aversion" and \less trade."
3.1 Denition of \More Ambiguity Aversion"





i2N where k = 1;2 represent dier-
ent situations of ambiguity aversion. The dierence between the two situations
might be due to the individuals' personal perception of the economic environ-
ment or to the evolution of the objective information about the environment.
For this, we need to formalize the notion of \more ambiguity aversion".
Dierent formalizations were proposed by Epstein (1999) and by Ghirardato
and Marinacci (2002), although their main idea agree with the following:15
13A similar result can be found in Bassanezi and Greco (1984)'s Proposition 4.5 for non-
negative functions under more complex measurability conditions. Our proof is more direct
than theirs.
14It is worth noticing the close relationship between f 2 B1 () satisfying (i) of Theorem
2.3, and what Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci (2004) called a crisp act, interpreting
that such acts cannot be used for hedging other acts.
15Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) make a distinction between \more uncertainty averse
than" and \more ambiguity averse than", which for simplicity we do not. Their notion of
\more ambiguity averse than" builds upon the less restrictive \more uncertainty averse than".
The dierence between the two notions is, loosely speaking, that \uncertainty" includes both
\ambiguity" and \risk". To talk about \more ambiguity averse than", one has to take out
the \risk" part.
8Denition 3.1 The preference <2 is more uncertainty averse than <1 if for
every unambiguous act h and every f 2 B1 (),16
h <1  
1
f ) h <2  
2
f: (1)
It should be understood in (1) that h is unambiguous for both <1 and <2.
That is, if <1 prefers an unambiguous act to f, then <2 also prefers. Ghi-
rardato and Marinacci (2002) show that in the case of MEU, this corresponds
to having the same utility function (up to ane transformations) and having a
bigger set of priors, that is, P2  P1. At any rate, what we need is that (1)
holds.
The above denition is inspired by the standard notion of \more risk averse
than". Recall that a preference <2 is more risk averse than <1 if for every
risk-free act h and every f 2 B1 (), h <1  
1
f ) h <2  
2
f. Thus, this
denition is just an adaptation of this to the ambiguity aversion case. Note
also that (1) requires consideration of a class of unambiguous acts and this is
taken as primitive by Epstein, while endogenously dened by Ghirardato and
Marinacci.






i2N has more ambiguity












i is unambiguous in both situations, for all i 2 N.
3.2 More Ambiguity Aversion Implies Less Trade Oppor-
tunities
For stating the result that \more ambiguity aversion implies less trade", we need
also to formalize the notion of \less trade". There are at least two alternative
denitions for this: having a smaller set of Pareto improving trades T (E) (see
the formal denition of this set in subsection 2.2) or having a smaller set of
Pareto optimal trades. We begin with the rst notion and discuss the second
notion afterward. The following theorem proves that more ambiguity aversion
leads to less trade in the sense of having a smaller set of Pareto improving trade
opportunities.
Theorem 3.1 If Em has more ambiguity aversion than El, then the set of
Pareto improving trades in economy El is bigger than the same set in economy




The following example shows that the inclusion T(Em)  T(El) can be strict.
16 Any denition of unambiguous acts will work for the results in this section. See, however,
section 2.3 for a specic denition of unambiguous acts for MEU and CEU preferences.
9Example 3.2 Let 
 = fa;b;cg and  = 2
. A probability over 
 is dened by
a vector  = (a;b;c) 2 [0;1]3, with the natural meaning that i = (fig),
for i = a;b;c. There are two parametrized economies: more, m, and less, l,
ambiguous averse, with two MEU DMs (N = f1;2g) such that:
 e1 = (7;1;1), u1(t) =
p
t and Pl
1 = fp0g; Pm
1 = fp0;q"g,




2 = fpg, for
where " 2 [0; 3
4] and  2 [0; 1


















Thus, more than one example, this presents a set of (parametrized) examples.
(The reason for oering a set of examples will become clear momentarily.) In the
appendix, we observe that this example satises the assumptions of Theorem 3.1.
There, we also show that z = (z1;z2), where z1 = ( 3;0;3) and z2 = (3;0; 3),
is a Pareto improving trade for economy El for suciently small  > 0, that is,
z 2 T(El). However, we also show that z = 2 T(Em), for suciently small " > 0,
that is, T(El) 6 T(Em). Actually, varying the parameter  we see that T(El) 6
T(Em) irrespective of whether a common prior exists (\i2NPk
i 6= ? ,  = 0)
or not (\i2NPk
i = ? ,  > 0), for k = m;l.
One may argue that the previous example is not totally convincing since the
considered possible trade z for El will not be observed since it can be Pareto
improved. Example 3.3 below aims to show that even some individually rational
Pareto optimal allocations of El may not correspond to a possible trade for
economy Em.
Example 3.3 Consider the above economy with parameters  = " = 0. Notice
that in economy l, the two decision makers are expected-utility maximizers with
the same prior p0 and the same utility function, which exhibits a constant coe-




u0(t) . In such a case, it is known that
Pareto optimal allocations f1, f2 with f1 = e, f2 = (1   )e, where  2 (0;1)
and e = (8;8;10) is the aggregate endowment. Simple computations show that
(f1;f2) is strictly individually rational if 0:49 6
p
 6 0:6. We show in the
appendix that if
p
 = 0:49 then e1 m
1 f1 = e. This implies that some of the
individually rational Pareto optimal for El are not Pareto improving trades for
Em.
As we observed before, it is possible to consider, however, another notion of
\less trade", which consider only the trades that are Pareto optimal, O(E). We
do not have a result about this situation, but we are able to provide a similar
10result to the previous one if we restrict our attention to unambiguous Pareto
optimal allocations. For this, recall from section 2.2 that Ou (E)  T (E) denotes
the set of trade proles z such that e+z is a Pareto optimal allocation and, for
each i, ei + zi is unambiguous. Then, we have:




It is important to observe that we did not restrict the preferences in The-
orems 3.1 and 3.4 to be CEU or MEU preferences. The proof uses only the
rationality of preferences <i for all i 2 N. Thus, as long as one has a notion of
unambiguous events that is consistent with (1) and assumes that endowments
are unambiguous, these results hold.





















for all unambiguous allocations (ei)i2N, then <2
i is more ambiguity averse than
<1
i, for all i.
Theorem 3.1 shows that ambiguity aversion may lead to a reduction of trade,
but it does not describe how much. An interesting case occurs when there is no
trade at all. This situation corresponds to the case where the initial endowment
is itself Pareto optimal. Thus, a characterization of no trade situations is equiv-
alent to a characterization of Pareto optimal allocations. This is the subject of
section 4 in the case of betting and section 5 in the case of insurance.
4 Betting and Ambiguity Aversion
In this section, we will characterize betting situations when two persons may
not trade because of ambiguity. Dow and Werlang (1992) were the rst to
consider the eect of ambiguity in a betting situation, for a single decision
maker. Their result was later generalized by Abouda and Chateauneuf (2002)
and Asano (2006). Chateauneuf, Dana, and Tallon (2000) go a step further, by
considering an economy where there are multiple CEU-DMs agents. Also, Billot,
Chateauneuf, Gilboa, and Tallon (2000) consider an economy with MEU-DMs.
We call \betting" a situation where the outcome does not aect the indi-
vidual's endowment (so there is no opportunity for insurance) or the stakes are
suciently small so that the individual is risk neutral. Both cases are summa-
rized by the following assumption:
Assumption 4.1 (Betting) The consumers are CEU or MEU maximizers
and that Ii (ui (ei)) = ui (Ii (ei)).
11Indeed, assumption 4.1 holds in two important cases: (1) when the endow-
ments are constant; (2) the endowments are unambiguous and the individuals
are risk neutral (utilities are linear). The betting assumption leads us to the
following:
Theorem 4.2 Consider an economy E = (<i;ei)i2N such that assumption 4.1
holds. Moreover, assume:
(i) for the MEU-paradigm: \i2NPi 6= ?;
(ii) for the CEU-paradigm: there are two consumers and 1 6 2.
Then T (E) = ?.
Notice that this result is related to one implication of Theorem 1 of Billot,
Chateauneuf, Gilboa, and Tallon (2000), which shows, under the MEU setting,
that the existence of a common prior (\i2NPi 6= ?) implies that any full in-
surance allocation is Pareto optimal. For this, they assumed that the aggregate
endowment is constant. Theorem 4.2 allows for the case where the aggregate
endowment is not constant. If the allocation is unambiguous, then it will be
Pareto optimal if the individuals are risk neutral. Note that the assumption
that individuals are risk neutral may be reasonable in some situations, espe-
cially when the stakes involved are small, which is sometimes the case in betting
situations.
5 Insurance and Ambiguity Aversion
This section oers characterizations of Pareto optimal allocations under dier-
ent conditions. Since Pareto optimal allocations are, by denition, exactly those
where trade cannot benet consumers, one can understand most results of this
section as no-trade theorems. Subsection 5.2 presents a general characterization
that will be useful for the subsequent results. The main result regarding non-
aggregate endowments is presented in subsection 5.3. This oers a new version
of the main result of Billot, Chateauneuf, Gilboa, and Tallon (2000) and Rigotti,
Shannon, and Strzalecki (2008) for the case of MEU-DMs and non-constant ag-
gregate endowments. Interestingly, one of the implications in the main result
of these papers is not part of our Theorem 5.2. This dierence is an essential
characteristic of the more general setting that we consider, as we explain in
subsection 5.4. Subsection 5.5 concludes with a result linking the set of unam-
biguous allocations in the MEU case with the set of Pareto optimal allocations
in the Expected Utility (EU) case with a common prior. In this section, we will
assume that the economy is \well-behaved," as we describe next.
5.1 Well-behaved Economies
Recall that  denotes a -algebra of subsets of 
 and that i   represents
the class of all unambiguous events for individual i. Let uu represent the unan-
imously unambiguous -algebra, that is, uu  _i2Ni is the nest common
12coarsening of the i. In particular, if A 2 uu, then A 2 i for all i 2 N and
if f is uu-measurable, then it is i-measurable for all i 2 N. Let eN denote
the total endowment of the economy, that is, eN(!) 
P
i2N ei(!);8! 2 
. We
say that eN is unanimously unambiguous if eN is uu-measurable. We say that
an allocation x = (xi)i2N is unanimously unambiguous if xi is unanimously
unambiguous for each i 2 N.
Given a probability P 2 (
) and a -eld F, a conditional probability
P(jF) is a function Q : 
   ! R+ satisfying:
(a) ! 7! Q(!;A) is F-measurable, for any A 2 ;
(b) for every B 2 F and A 2 ,
Z
B
Q(!;A) dP(!) = P(A \ B):
In this case, we dene the P-conditional probability of A 2  at !, denoted
P(AjF)! as Q(!;A). Following the usual practice, ! will be omitted.
Finally, we denote the set f(juu) :  2 Pig by Puu
i . This set corresponds
to the set of all conditional probabilities with respect to the unanimously unam-
biguous -algebra. Thus, the condition \i2NPuu
i 6= ; below means that there
is at least one conditional probability that is common to all individuals.
Denition 5.1 (Well-behaved economy) We say that an economy E = (<i
;ei)i2N is well-behaved if:
 each i 2 N is MEU-DM with a C2 utility function ui : R+ ! R, satisfying
u0
i > 0 and u00
i < 0 and the limx!0+ u0
i(x) = +1;17
 for each i 2 N, ei is norm-interior, that is, inf!2
 ei(!) > 0;
 for every i 2 N and  2 Pi,  is countably additive;
 for every i;j 2 N, and every i 2 Pi and j 2 Pj, i and j are mutually
absolutely continuous.
5.2 Characterization of Pareto Optimal Allocations
We now consider n MEU-DM, where ui is of class C1, and u0
i () > 0 for all i.
We also assume that the endowments ei belong to B+
1 (). The corresponding
economy is E = (<i;ei)i2N.
If  2  and f 2 B+
1 (), let f denote the (nitely additive) measure
given by (f)(A) =
R

















17Strict concavity of ui is not necessary for most of the results below.
13The theorem below characterizes Pareto optimal allocations through the
sets dened in (2). This result parallels, but for an innite state space, Rigotti
and Shannon (2005)'s Theorem 3, derived for Bewley (1986, 2002)'s model. It
extends the main result of Billot, Chateauneuf, Gilboa, and Tallon (2000) to the
situation of aggregate uncertainty, allowing for the MEU-model to characterize
full insurance Pareto optimal allocation under weaker conditions. We proved
this result in the rst version of this paper, before we became aware of a more
general result, by Rigotti, Shannon, and Strzalecki (2008) (see their Proposition
7). According to these authors, their main contribution is to recognize that
this theorem (and other results that they obtain) are easy consequences of the
Second Welfare Theorem.18 However, another contribution of this theorem is
to recognize that one should use a modied set of priors, which, in our setup,
is the set dened by (2).
Theorem 5.1 Consider a well-behaved economy E = (<i;ei)i2N of MEU-DM
and let x = (xi)i2N be norm-interior. Then the following are equivalent:
(i) (xi)i2N is Pareto optimal;
(ii) \i2NPi (xi) 6= ?.
This theorem will be instrumental for our next results below.19
5.3 Unanimously Unambiguous Aggregate Endowments
The following holds for well-behaved economies:
Theorem 5.2 Consider a well-behaved economy E = (<i;ei)i2N and assume
that the aggregate endowment eN 
P
i2N ei is unanimously unambiguous. The
following assertions are equivalent:
(i) There exists a norm-interior unanimously unambiguous Pareto optimal
allocation.
(ii) Any Pareto optimal allocation is an unanimously unambiguous allocation.
(iii) \i2NPuu
i 6= ;.
It is worth comparing the previous result with the main result of Billot,
Chateauneuf, Gilboa, and Tallon (2000) and Rigotti, Shannon, and Strzalecki
(2008):
Theorem (Billot et al. (2000), Rigotti et.al. (2008)) Assume that the
economy is well-behaved and that the aggregate endowment is constant. Then
the following statements are equivalent:
18Our original proof (omitted in this version) used a separation of convex sets as an essential
step. Rigotti, Shannon, and Strzalecki (2008) were able to avoid separation arguments, since
the proof of the Second Welfare Theorem is already based in such kind of arguments.
19Despite its generality and usefulness, Theorem 5.1 is not completely satisfactory from a
characterization point of view, because the probabilities in the sets Pi(xi) are distorted by
the marginal utilities of consumers. Therefore, those probabilities do not depend exclusively
on the agents' beliefs.
14(i) There exists a norm-interior full insurance Pareto optimal allocation.
(ii) Any Pareto optimal allocation is a full insurance allocation.
(iii) Every full insurance allocation is Pareto optimal.
(iv) \i2NPi 6= ;.
The main dierences are: 1) they assume that the aggregate endowment is
constant, while we assume that it is unanimously unambiguous; 2) their common
prior condition is in terms of ex-ante beliefs, while ours is in terms of condi-
tional beliefs; 3) we do not include a parallel statement for \every unanimously
unambiguous allocation is Pareto optimal". The reason for the third dierence
will be discussed in the next subsection.
5.4 Pareto Optimality for Every Unambiguous Allocations
Let us explain why we cannot include a statement like \every unanimously un-
ambiguous allocation is Pareto optimal" in Theorem 5.2. Recall that eN(!) = P
i2N ei(!) and let B denote (eN), that is, the smallest -algebra with respect
to which eN is measurable. An allocation x = (xi)i2N is B-unambiguous if each
xi is B-measurable for every i 2 N. Note that if eN is unanimously unam-
biguous, the requirement that x is B-unambiguous is stronger than to require
that x is unanimously unambiguous. Also, it is not dicult to construct exam-
ples where the aggregate endowment eN is unanimously unambiguous but the
endowment e = (ei)i2N is not B-unambiguous nor unanimously unambiguous.
Theorem 5.3 Consider a well-behaved economy E = (<i;ei)i2N and assume
that the aggregate endowment eN is unanimously unambiguous; 
 is nite and
n > 3. Then the following are equivalent:
(i) Every B-unambiguous allocation is Pareto optimal.20
(ii) \iPi 6= ; and eN is constant (which implies B = f;;
g).
In this case, we also have the existence of a norm-interior full insurance
Pareto optimal allocation and that any Pareto optimal allocation is full insur-
ance.
This theorem explains why the statement \every unanimously unambiguous
allocation is Pareto optimal" cannot be among the equivalent statements of
Theorem 5.2. Namely, that statement is stronger than any of the statements
in Theorem 5.2. In fact, Theorem 5.3 shows that even a weaker statement like
\every B-unambiguous allocation is Pareto optimal" is sucient to imply that
the aggregate endowment is constant.
Finally, we state a result that is used in the proof of the above theorems
and may be of interest by its own. It is related to Theorem 2 of Rothschild and
Stiglitz (1970).
20If eN is unanimously unambiguous, then every B-unambiguous allocation is also unani-
mously unambiguous. This shows that, under the hypotheses of the Theorem, item (i) is a
weaker statement than \every unanimously unambiguous allocation is Pareto optimal."
15Proposition 5.4 Let (
;A;P) be a probabilistic space. Let B be a sub--
algebra of A, X a bounded A-measurable random variable which is not B-
measurable and Y  E [XjB]. Then, for any concave, increasing function
u : R ! R, E [u(X)] 6 E [u(Y )]. If u is strictly concave, the inequality is
strict.
5.5 Pareto Optimal Allocations in MEU and EU
Now we obtain a characterization of unambiguous Pareto optimal allocations
with respect to Pareto optimal allocations in an economy with Expected Utility
(EU) DMs . This is related to a result by Chateauneuf, Dana, and Tallon (2000)
for the CEU case. For this, let us introduce the following notation:
 Ou
MEU denotes the set of unambiguous Pareto optimal allocations of a
MEU economy;
 Au
MEU is the set of unambiguous allocations for the MEU economy;
 OEU() denotes the set of Pareto optimal allocations of the economy with
expected utility (EU) DMs with common prior .
Theorem 5.5 Assume that  2 \i2NPi. Then, Ou
MEU = OEU() \ Au
MEU.
This result is useful because it establishes a clear connection between the set
of Pareto optimal allocations in the economy with ambiguity aversion and each
of the related economies with standard expected utility DMs.
6 Application: Home Bias
In this section, we show how our results could be used to explain phenomena
in real world economies. The ideas developed here are not completely new.
They go back at least to Bewley (1989). In fact many authors have tried to use
ambiguity aversion to explain the phenomena below, most notably Epstein and
Miao (2003).21
Home bias has been observed in two related forms: \equity home bias,"
which was observed in the nance literature as the tendency to hold few for-
eign assets; and \consumption home bias", reported in the international trade
literature for the fact that there is less trade between countries than reasonable
transportation costs would be able to explain.22 Our results can explain these
phenomea, since the key feature of our no-trade result is well tted to the in-
ternational trade situation: the consumer knows the probability governing his
own endowments, but has uncertainty regarding the endowments in the foreign
country, because of lack of knowledge about that country. Our theory also has
21See also Alonso (2004).
22Tre
er (1995) coined the term \missing trade" to depict the extent to which measured
trade is still negligible compared to the prediction of pure theory. He relates the home bias
eect to other puzzles in international trade.
16a testable prediction: if the ambiguity aversion diminishes (for instance, with
better knowledge), then trade should increase.
Let us consider an economy with one good, two periods, and two countries.
In the rst period, there is trade of contingent contracts for the second period.
In country H (home), the set of consumers is NH =

1;:::;nH	
and in country F
(foreign), it is NF =

nH + 1;:::;nH + nF	
. The set of all consumers, assumed
to be MEU-DMs with strictly concave ui, is N = NH [ NF. The set of states
of the world is 
, assumed to be nite with m dierent states. We assume that
for each country C, C = H;F, all consumers have the same set of prior PC and
that the set of unambiguous events for all consumers in country C is an algebra
C.23 We again assume that each consumer has unambiguous endowments,
that is, a consumer i who lives in country C, for C = H;F, has endowment
ei : 
 ! R, which is measurable with respect to C.24 Thus, endowments are
unambiguous inside each country, but may be ambiguous across countries. This
is very close to the standard assumption of expected utility maximizers and
seems reasonable.
Now, we dene Pareto optimal allocations for two settings: closed and open
economies. In closed economies, the 
ow of goods between the countries is
forbidden, and Pareto improvement is considered only if trade is restricted to
be among individuals in the same country. In the open economy, goods are free
to circulate between the countries.
Denition 6.1 An allocation (xi)i2N is closed-Pareto optimal if there is no
vector (zi)i2N such that
(i) for all i 2 N, xi+zi <i xi and there exists j 2 N such that xj +zj j xj.
(ii)
P
i2NC zi = 0; for C = H;F.
Denition 6.2 An allocation (xi)i2N is open-Pareto optimal if it is Pareto
optimal for the whole economy E = (<i;ei)i2N, that is , where it is valid (i) of
the previous denition and:
(ii)'
P
i2N zi = 0:
We rst establish a useful result that may be of interest by itself.
Corollary 6.1 If (xi)i2N is a closed-Pareto optimal allocation then it is unam-
biguous for each consumer.
23In fact, it is sucient that the consumers in each country share at least a common prior.
Also, as discussed in section 2.3, the assumption that C is an algebra will be without loss of
generality in the particular case of ambiguity averse CEU-DMs.
24It is sucient to assume that only the aggregate endowment of each country is unambigu-
ous to the consumers in that country.
17Recall that PH and PF characterize the set of priors in the home and in
the foreign countries, respectively. Let us denote by Puu
C the set of conditional
priors obtained from PC by conditioning the prior to the set of unambiguous
events C, for C = H;F. The following theorem establishes conditions for the
non-existence of trade between countries in the open economy.
Corollary 6.2 A closed-Pareto optimal allocation (xi)i2N is open-Pareto opti-
mal if and only if Puu
H \ Puu
F 6= ?.
The interpretation of these results is that if the individuals in dierent coun-
tries have suciently broad set of priors, they will not trade. In particular, if in
each country they believe that the individuals in the foreign country know more
than themselves about that country, they will be willing to include the priors
of these individuals in their set of possible priors. This will lead to no-trade.
It is also useful to observe that a much weaker condition is sucient for both
results above, since Theorem 5.2 requires only that individuals share a common
conditional prior.
7 Conclusion
This paper presents results that do not depend on the standard assumptions in
MEU and CEU paradigms, constant endowments, no aggregate uncertainty or
comonotonicity of endowments, as most of the available papers assume. In doing
this, we provide no-trade theorems that can be used to explain and understand
many phenomena of the real world economy.
Some of the results of this paper are established only for CEU and MEU
preferences. It is an open question whether these results hold for more general
for instance, the MBC and MBA preferences characterized by Ghirardato and
Siniscalchi (2010) and Cerreia-Vioglio, Ghirardato, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and
Siniscalchi (2010).
A Appendix
A.1 CEU and MEU decision makers
Except for the results in section 3, we assume that consumers have preferences
following the Choquet Expected Utility (CEU) or the Maximin Expected Utility
(MEU) paradigms, as we dene now.25
25For axiomatizations of CEU preferences, see Gilboa (1987), Schmeidler (1989) and Chew
and Karni (1994). For axiomatizations of MEU preferences, Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989),
Casadesus-Masanell, Klibano, and Ozdenoren (2000) and Ghirardato, Maccheroni, Mari-
nacci, and Siniscalchi (2003).
18In the CEU paradigm, there is a capacity  :  ! [0;1], which is a set
function satisfying  (;) = 0,  (
) = 1 and monotonicity, i.e., for all A;B 2 ,
A  B )  (A) 6  (B). Although this is not necessary for most results, we will
assume that all capacities in our paper are continuous, that is, for any increasing
sequence of sets An, An " 
, we have (An) " 1.
For a function h 2 B1 (), the Choquet integral of h with respect to  is
denoted by
R






[ (h > t)   1]dt +
Z 1
0
 (h > t)dt: (3)
We assume that a CEU consumer or decision maker (DM) has a preference over
B1 () dened by a utility function U : B1 () ! R given by
U (f) = I (u  f) =
Z
u(f)d;
for some continuous function u : R ! R.
It is useful to introduce some standard denitions. We say that  is convex
if 8A;B 2 ,  (A [ B)+  (A \ B) >  (A)+  (B). The core of  is the set of
probability measures dened over  which are never below , that is, the set:
core(;) = f 2 (
;) :  (A) >  (A);8A 2 g:
If  is clear, we may write core() instead of core(;). The dual capacity of
, denoted by , is dened as  (A) = 1   (Ac), 8A 2 .
In the MEU paradigm, we assume that there is a weak compact set P
of probability measures over 
. The MEU decision maker (MEU-DM) has a
preference over B1 () which can be represented by the utility function U :
B1 () ! R dened by
U (f) = min
p2P




again for some continuous function u : R ! R. For convenience, if h 2 B1 (),
we will denote
R
hdp by Ip (h) and minp2P
R
hdp by IP (h). When we want
to refer both to CEU-DMs and MEU-DMs, we will write just I (h) instead of
I (h) and IP (h). When we consider a set of consumers indexed by i, we will
use subscripts in all the notation given above, that is, we will write Ii (h), i,
Pi, ui and Ui.
It is well known that the CEU and MEU paradigms are identical in the
particular case where P = core(;) and  is convex. In the general case, we
will maintain the following assumption for both paradigms:
Assumption A.1 u is strictly increasing, weakly concave and continuous.
Let "u and #u denote monotonic uniform convergence. The following well-
known result will be useful.
Lemma A.2 Assume that fbngn2N is a sequence in B1 () and b 2 B1 ().
If bn "u b, then, I (bn) "u I (b). Similarly, if bn #u b, then I (bn) #u I (b).
Proof. Omitted.
19A.2 Some results about unambiguous acts and events
As Zhang (2002) argues, the set of unambiguous events should be a -system.
A set    is a -system if the following holds:
(i) 
 2 ;
(ii) A 2  ) Ac 2 ;
(iii) If A1;A2;::: 2  are pairwise disjoint, then [k2NAk 2 .
For completeness, we observe the following:
Proposition A.3 u is a -system.
Proof of Proposition A.3. Items (i) and (ii) of the denition are trivial.
Consider now A, B 2 u, A \ B = ? and let C 2 . In the CEU-paradigm,
 (C) =  (C \ A) +  (C \ Ac)
=  (C \ A) +  (C \ Ac \ B) +  (C \ Ac \ Bc)
=  (C \ (A [ B) \ A) +  (C \ (A [ B) \ Ac) +  (C \ (Ac \ Bc))
=  (C \ (A [ B)) +  (C \ (A [ B)
c):
Thus, A [ B 2 u. In MEU-paradigm,  (A [ B) =  (A)+  (B). If  (A) =
0 (A) and  (B) = 0 (B) 8, 0 2 P, then
 (A [ B) =  (A) +  (B) = 0 (A) + 0 (B) = 0 (A [ B);
8, 0 2 P and we conclude that A[B 2 u. This shows that u is closed to -
nite unions. Property (iii) now follows from the Monotone Uniform Convergence
Theorem (Lemma A.2).
Although u may fail to be an algebra in the MEU paradigm, we have the
following:
Proposition A.4 In the CEU paradigm, u is an algebra.
Proof of Proposition A.4. Let A1, A2 2 u. Because of Proposition A.3,
it is sucient to prove that A1\A2 belongs to u. So let B 2 . From A1 2 u
we obtain:
 (A1 \ A2 \ B) =  (A2 \ B)    (Ac
1 \ A2 \ B): (4)
From A2 2 u we obtain:
 ((Ac
1 [ Ac
2) \ B) =  (A2 \ (Ac
1 [ Ac





 ((A1 \ A2)
c \ B) =  (Ac
1 \ A2 \ B) +  (Ac
2 \ B): (5)
20Adding (4) and (5) , we have:
 ((A1 \ A2) \ B) +  ((A1 \ A2)
c \ B) =  (A2 \ B) +  (Ac
2 \ B) =  (B);
where the last equality holds because A2 2 u. This concludes the proof.
The following Proposition A.5 enlightens some properties of unambiguous
events in the CEU paradigm with ambiguity aversion, that is, when the decision
makers have a convex capacity . This result can be found in Nehring (1999),
but the following proof is direct.
Proposition A.5 For CEU-DM with convex ,
u = fA 2  :  (A) +  (Ac) = 1g:
Proof. A 2 u )  (A) +  (Ac) = 1 follows by taking B = 
. We want
to show that if A 2  such that  (A) +  (Ac) = 1, then for any B 2 ,
 (B) =  (B \ A)+  (B \ Ac). Since  is convex and A \ B  B  Ac [ B,
there exists  2 core() such that  (A \ B) =  (A \ B),  (B) =  (B) and
 (Ac [ B) =  (Ac [ B). From this,  (B) =  (B) =  (A \ B) +  (Ac \ B)
=  (A \ B)+  (Ac \ B). Thus, it is sucient to prove that  (Ac \ B) =
 (Ac \ B). Since  2 core(), then  (Ac \ B) >  (Ac \ B) and  (A) >  (A)
and  (Ac) >  (Ac). Since  (A) +  (Ac) = 1, then  (Ac) =  (Ac). Then,
 (Ac \ B) 6  (Ac \ B)
=  (B) +  (Ac)    (Ac [ B) =  (B) +  (Ac)    (Ac [ B):
Since  is convex,  (Ac \ B) +  (Ac [ B) >  (B) +  (Ac), which proves that
the inequality above is, in fact, an equality, as we wanted to show.
Notice also that for CEU ambiguity averse DMs, u consistently coincides
with the denition given in the MEU-paradigm, that is, we have:
Lemma A.6 If  is a convex capacity, then
u = fA 2  :  (A) = 0 (A); for any ;0 2 core()g:
Proof. If A 2 u, by Proposition A.5,  (A) +  (Ac) = 1 which implies
 (A) =  (A), 8 2 core(), because  (A) >  (A) and  (Ac) >  (Ac).
Conversely, let A 2  be such that  (A) = 0 (A) for any ; 0 2 core().
Since  (Ac) = 1    (A), then  (Ac) = 0 (Ac) for any ; 0 2 core(). There
exist , 0 2 core() such that  (A) =  (A) and 0 (Ac) =  (Ac). Thus,
1 =  (A)+  (Ac) =  (A)+ 0 (Ac) =  (A)+  (Ac). By Proposition A.5,
A 2 u.
The following observation may be useful.
Lemma A.7 Let f : 
 ! R+ be a simple act given f =
Pm
k=1 xk1Ak, where
xk < xk+1, for all k 2 f1;:::;m   1g;Ak 2  and fAk : 1 6 k 6 mg is a
21partition of 
. If each Ak is unambiguous then f is unambiguous. In the CEU
paradigm, the converse is also true.
Proof. Observe that the events ff > tg are of the form 
, Ai [  [ Am, for
i = 1;:::;m or ?. Since u is a -system by Proposition A.3, these events are
in u, which means that f is unambiguous.
For the converse in the CEU paradigm, we write f as
f = x11
 + (x2   x1)1A2[[An +  + (xm   xm 1)1An:
Since ff > tg 2 u for almost all t, there exists t 2 (xk;xk+1) such that
ff > tg = Ak+1 [[Am 2 u. Since u is an algebra in the CEU paradigm,
then the Ak are unambiguous.
A.3 Proofs
Proof of Theorem 2.1. Let us rst consider the MEU case. We know that








Since f is unambiguous, ff > tg 2 u for all t 2 R, which means that
p(f > t) =  (f > t) for all p; 2 P. This implies that Ip (f) is constant
across all p 2 P. In particular, Ip (f) = IP (f), for all p 2 P. This allows us to
obtain:













[IP (f) + Ip (g)]
= IP (f) + min
p2P
Ip (g)
= IP (f) + IP (g);
as we wanted to show.
Let us turn now to the CEU case. Let f;g 2 B1 (), with f unambiguous.
We want to prove that
I (f + g) = I (f) + I (g): (6)
First, we claim that it is enough to prove (6) for f > 0 and g > 0. In fact,
since f;g 2 B+
1 (), there exist a;b 2 R, a > 0 and b > 0, such that f + a > 0
and g + b > 0. It is clear that f + a 2 B+
1 () and g + b 2 B+
1 () and f + a
is unambiguous, that is, ff + a > tg 2 u, for all t 2 R. Thus, if (6) is valid
for non-negative functions, I (f + a + g + b) = I (f + a) + I (g + b). Since
22the Choquet integral is additive for constants, we conclude that I (f + g) =
I (f) + I (g).
Now, let us dene
R








for all A 2 u and h 2 B+
1 (). In fact, since A is unambiguous,  (h > t) =








 (fh > tg \ A)dt +
Z 1
0








Now, suppose that h = 1A + g, for some g 2 B+
1 (),  > 0 and A 2 u.
From (7), we have:
I (1A + g) =
Z
A











Since  is a constant (and hence comonotonic with g), we have
R
A ( + g)d = R
A d+
R
A gd (from Schmeidler (1986)'s Theorem). Also,
R
A d =  (A)




Ac gd = I (g). Thus,
I (1A + g) =  (A) + I (g) = I (1A) + I (g); (8)
which is (6) for the case f = 1A.
Now, consider f 2 B
+
0 () and g 2 B+
1 (). Since f 2 B
+
0 (), there exist
n 2 N and, for each i = 1;:::;n, xi 2 R+, 0 6 x1 < x2 <  < xn, such that:
f = x11
 + (x2   x1)1ff>x2g +  + (xn   xn 1)1ff>xng:
Dene the following functions: gn = g + (xn   xn 1)1ff>xng, gn 1 = gn +
(xn 1   xn 2)1ff>xn 1g, ..., g2 = g3 + (x2   x1)1ff>x2g. Thus, f +g = x11
+
g2. Using (8) repeatedly, we have:
I (f + g) = I (x11
) + I (g2)
= x1 + (x2   x1) (f > x2) + I (g3)
= :::
= x1 + (x2   x1) (f > x2) + ::: + (xn   xn 1) (f > xn) + I (g)
= I (f) + I (g).
23It remains to prove (6) for any unambiguous f 2 B+
1 (). We use the












It is easy to see that f unambiguous implies that fn 2 B+
1 () is unambiguous.
Hence,
I (fn + g) = I (fn) + I (g),
for all n. It is also clear that fn + g "n f + g and fn "n f. By Lemma A.2,
we have I (fn + g) "n I (f + g) and I (fn) "n I (f), which concludes the
proof.
Proof of Theorem 2.3. Since (iii) ) (i) was already proved and (i) ) (ii)
is trivial (take g =  f), it is sucient to prove that (ii) ) (iii). So take f 2
B1 () such that I (f)+ I ( f) = 0. We know that the Choquet integral can




[ ( f > t)   1]dt +
Z 1
0
 ( f > t)dt:




[ (f < t)   1]dt +
Z 0
 1





[ (f > t)   1]dt +
Z 1
0




[ (f > t) +  (f < t)   1]dt +
Z 1
0
[ (f > t) +  (f < t)   1]dt = 0: (9)
Since f is bounded, the interval of integration of the integrand x(t) =  (f > t)+
 (f < t)   1 is a compact interval K. Moreover,  (f > t) and  (f < t) are
monotone and so continuous, except on a countable (nite or denumerable) set
of points of K. As  is convex,  (f > t)+ (f < t) 6 1, that is, x(t) 6 0. From
(9), x(t) < 0 on K in a set of zero measure. Thus,  (f  t) +  (f < t) = 1
almost everywhere. Since
u = fA 2  :  (A) +  (Ac) = 1g
by Proposition A.5, then ff > tg 2 u almost everywhere, i.e., f is unambigu-
ous.





i2N zi = 0,
(zi)i2N 6= 0, ei + zi <2
i ei for all i 2 N and there exists j such that ej + zj 2
j
ej. We claim that the same (zi)i2N satises ei + zi <1
i ei for all i 6= j and
ej + zj 1




see that the claim is true, suppose by contradiction that ei 1
i ei + zi for some
i 6= j. Since <2
i is more uncertainty averse than <1
i and ei is unambiguous for
individual i, this implies that ei 2
i ei+zi, a contradiction. In the same fashion,
if ej <1
j ej + zj then ej <2
j ej + zj, again a contradiction.
Proof of claims in example 3.2. It is not dicult to see that e1 is
unambiguous for both <l
1 and <m









Notice that z = (z1;z2), where z1 = ( 3;0;3) and z2 = (3;0; 3), is a Pareto
improving trade for economy El if  = 0. In fact, let x1 = e1 + z1 = (4;1;4)

























7 + 3) = IPl
2(u(e2)):





such that z remains a feasible, Pareto improving trade for economy El for any
 2 [0;0]. In what follows we assume that such an  has been chosen; this is
to emphasize the fact that T(Em) 6 T(El) is independent of the existence or
non-existence of a common prior for the individuals, i.e., it is independent of
\i2NPi 6= ? ( ()  = 0) or \i2NPi = ? ( ()  6= 0). It is enough to see














4  2 + (3




4. Since this inequality is true for
" = 0, this completes the proof.
Proof of claim in example 3.3. We want to show that e1 m








































































. This implies that
there is (z0
i)i2N such that ei +z0
i <1
i ei +zi for all i 2 N and there exists j such
that ej + z0
j 1
j ej + zj. Using the same argument of the proof of Theorem 3.1,
we reach a contradiction.








































ei + zi. Since this holds for all
unambiguous endowments, <2
i is more uncertainty averse than <1
i by the de-
nition.
The following result is useful for the proof of Theorem 4.2.
Lemma A.8 (i) In the MEU-paradigm, \i2NPi 6= ? if and only if
P
i2N zi = 0
)
P
i2N Ii (zi) 6 0;
(ii) In the CEU paradigm, if 1 6 2 then I1 (z)+ I2 ( z) 6 0, for all
z 2 B1 ().
Proof. (i) Let  2 \i2NPi. If
P
i2N zi = 0, then
P







= 0. Conversely, suppose that \i2NPi = ?. Then, Theorem
2 of Billot, Chateauneuf, Gilboa, and Tallon (2000) can be used to show that
there are (zi)i2N such that
P
i2N zi = 0 and
P
i2N Ii (zi) > 0, completing the
proof.
(ii) If 1 6 2, then I1 (1A) = 1 (A) 6 1  2 (Ac) = 1  I2 (1Ac), which
implies I1 (1A) + I2 (1Ac) 6 1. Now, if z = 1A, then I2 ( z) = 1   I2 (1Ac).
Thus, I1 (1A) + I2 ( 1A) 6 0. We proceed now, as in the proof of Theorem 2.1,
extending this to simple z and, by monotonicity, to z 2 B1 ():
Proof of Theorem 4.2. For a contradiction, assume that (zi)i2N 2 T (E).
Since ui is concave by assumption A.1, Jensen's inequality gives26
Ui (ei + zi) = Ii (ui (ei + zi)) 6 ui (Ii (ei + zi)):
Since ei is unambiguous, Ii (ei + zi) = Ii (ei) + Ii (zi), by the Additivity The-
orem (Theorem 2.1). This implies that: Ui(ei + zi) 6 ui (Ii (ei) + Ii (zi)). The
assumption that ui(Ii(ei)) = Ui(ei) and the fact that ei + zi <i ei give:
ui(Ii(ei)) = Ui(ei) 6 Ui(ei + zi) 6 ui (Ii (ei) + Ii (zi)):
Since ui is increasing, this implies that Ii(zi) > 0, for all i 2 N. Moreover, since
ej +zj j ej for some j 2 N, Ij(zj) > 0. Therefore,
P
i2N Ii(zi) > 0. However,
this contradicts the conclusions of Lemma A.8.
The proof of Theorem 5.2 requires the following:
26Jensen's inequality can be easily extended for MEU and CEU paradigms.
26Lemma A.9 Given P;P 0 2 (
), suppose that P0 = fP, for some B-measurable
function f : 
 ! R+. Then, P(jB) = P0(jB).
Proof. Notice that f is (a version of) the Radon-Nikodym derivative dP
0
dP . Fix
A 2  and dene for each B 2 B, (B) = P(A\B) and 0(B) = P0(A\B). It
is easy to see that d
0
d = f. Let Q and Q0 denote the conditional probabilities
of P and P0, respectively. By condition (b) in the denition of conditional
probability, it is clear that d
dP = Q and d
0
dP 0 = Q0. Now, by the chain rule for


















Therefore, Q0 = Q, as we wanted to show.
Proof of Theorem 5.2 (i) ) (iii): Suppose that x = (xi)i2N is a norm-
interior unanimously unambiguous Pareto optimal allocation. By Theorem 5.1,















i(xi()) di is uu-measurable. By Lemma A.9, p(juu) =
i(juu), which proves that p(juu) 2 Puu
i for all i 2 N, that is, (iii) holds.
(iii) ) (ii): Suppose that x = (xi)i2N is a Pareto optimal allocation and
that for some i0 2 N, xi0 is not uu-measurable. Let us rst build a new
(feasible) allocation yi, which is unambiguous with respect to uu. For this
purpose take  2 \i2NPi and dene yi by yi  E [xijuu]. Moreover, since eN
is uu-measurable by assumption, the feasibility of x, i.e.
P





i yi = eN, that is, yi is feasible. If we prove that yi <i xi for
all i 2 N and yi0 i xi0 this will contradict Pareto optimality of (xi)i2N, hence
proving the result. First, for any consumer i, Ui(xi) = min02Pi E0[ui(xi)] 6
E[ui(xi)]. From Proposition 5.4, E[ui(xi)] 6 E[ui(yi)]. Since yi is unam-




Therefore, Ui(xi) 6 Ui(yi) for all i 2 N. Repeating this argument now with
the strict inequality in Proposition 5.4, that is, E[ui0(xi0)] < E[ui0(yi0)], we
obtain Ui0(xi0) < Ui0(yi0). Thus, y Pareto improves x, which is a contradiction.
(ii) ) (i): Since E is well-behaved, the assumptions of Proposition 12 of
Rigotti, Shannon, and Strzalecki (2008) are satised. Therefore, there exist an
27Of course, the equalities are in the \almost surely" sense. Since the measures are mutually
absolutely continuous, there is no ambiguity on this.
27individually rational Pareto optimal allocation x. Since ei is norm-interior for
each i and the economy is well-behaved, xi is also norm-interior. By (ii), x is a
norm-interior unanimously unambiguous allocation.
The proof of Theorem 5.3 requires some lemmas.
Lemma A.10 Assume that ui is C1, with u0
i > 0 for i = 1;2. Let x1;x2 2 R+




2(x2   y2) = u0
2(x1   y1)u0
1(y2):
Proof. Dene g(y1;y2)  u0
1(y1)u0
2(x2   y2)   u0
2(x1   y1)u0
1(y2), for (y1;y2) 2
[0;x1]  [0;x2]. Since x2 < x1,
g(y;y) = u0
1(y)u0












Since g is continuous, there exists (y1;y2) 2 (0;x1)(0;x2) such that g(y1;y2) =
0, which is the desired equality.
Lemma A.11 Assume statement (i) in Theorem 5.3. Then, i(B) = j(B)
for any B 2 B, i 2 Pi, j 2 Pj and i;j 2 N.
Proof. Since 
 is nite, there is a partition of 
 associated to B in the sense
that each element of B is a union of elements of this partition. Each element of
this partition is called an atom. Fix an atom B of B and any two individuals,
which without loss of generality, we can assume to be 1 and 2. Since eN is
B-measurable, eN(!) = lB for some constant lB 2 R++, for all ! 2 B. Dene
lBc  inf!2Bc eN(!) > 0 and l = minflB;lBcg. Choose 0 < `Bc < `B < l. By
Lemma A.10, there exists (xB
1 ;xB
c















2 ) = (`B   xB
1 ;`Bc   xB
c
1 ). Now, dene the following allocation:
x1(!) = xB













1Bc(!); for i > 3:
This allocation is clearly B-unambiguous. Therefore, by (i), it is Pareto optimal.














































By (10), we have:
1(B)2(Bc) = 1(Bc)2(B);
which implies 1(B) = 2(B). Since B  i for every i 2 N, 1(B) = (B)
for every  2 P1, and the same holds for individual 2. Since the individuals
and the atom were arbitrarily chosen, we have i(B) = j(B) for any B 2 B,
i 2 Pi, j 2 Pj and i;j 2 N, as we wanted to conclude.
Lemma A.12 Assume statement (i) in Theorem 5.3. Then e is constant.
Therefore, B = f;;
g.
Proof. Take 0 <  < inf!2
 eN(!), and dene the allocation x = (xi)i2N by
xi = 
n 1 for i 6= 1 and x1(!) = eN(!)   . By Theorem 5.1, for every atom B





1(B) = i(B);8! 2 B:




k(xk()) d, for all ! 2 B. Since B was
arbitrary, this shows that x1 and, therefore, eN, is constant.
Now we can complete the proof of Theorem 5.3.
Proof of Theorem 5.3. (i) ) (ii): Since every full insurance allocation
is a B-unambiguous allocation, (i) implies that every full insurance allocation is
Pareto optimal. By previous lemmas, e is constant. Thus, we are in the setting
of Theorem 1 of Billot, Chateauneuf, Gilboa, and Tallon (2000), which implies
that \iPi 6= ; (and all other implications in the theorem hold).
(ii) ) (i): Since e is constant, Theorem 1 of Billot, Chateauneuf, Gilboa,
and Tallon (2000) implies that every Pareto optimal allocation is a full insurance
allocation and, therefore, B-unambiguous.
Proof of Proposition 5.4 Let us denote by EB[Z] the conditional expec-
tation E [ZjB]. By Jensen's inequality, EB[u(X)] 6 u(EB[X]) = u(Y ), with







with strict inequality if u is strictly concave.
29Proof of Theorem 5.5. Since the MEU economy is more ambiguous averse
than the economy EU(), the inclusion Ou
MEU  OEU() \ Au
MEU follows from
Theorem 3.4, since all allocations are unambiguous in an economy with EU-
DMs. Now, let (xi)i2N 2 OEU() \ Au
MEU for some  2 \i2NPi. Pareto




























Since xi is unambiguous for i, then  2 argminp2Pi
R

 ui (xi())dp = Pi, which
shows that p 2 Pi(xi) for every i 2 N. This concludes the proof.
Proof of Corollary 6.1. Recall that the individuals in each country are
assumed to have the same set of priors PC, for C = H;F and that the aggregate
endowment in each country is unambiguous for the individuals in that country.
Therefore, the result comes directly from Theorem 5.2.
Proof of Corollary 6.2. This is a direct application of Theorem 5.2.
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